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Abstract—Malicious email attachments are a growing
delivery vector for malware. While machine learning has
been successfully applied to portable executable (PE)
malware detection, we ask, can we extend similar ap-
proaches to detect malware across heterogeneous file types
commonly found in email attachments? In this paper, we
explore the feasibility of applying machine learning as a
static countermeasure to detect several types of malicious
email attachments including Microsoft Office documents
and Zip archives. To this end, we collected a dataset of over
5 million malicious/benign Microsoft Office documents
from VirusTotal for evaluation as well as a dataset of
benign Microsoft Office documents from the Common
Crawl corpus, which we use to provide more realistic
estimates of thresholds for false positive rates on in-the-
wild data. We also collected a dataset of approximately
500k malicious/benign Zip archives, which we scraped
using the VirusTotal service, on which we performed a
separate evaluation. We analyze predictive performance of
several classifiers on each of the VirusTotal datasets using a
70/30 train/test split on first seen time, evaluating feature
and classifier types that have been applied successfully
in commercial antimalware products and R&D contexts.
Using deep neural networks and gradient boosted decision
trees, we are able to obtain ROC curves with > 0.99
AUC on both Microsoft Office document and Zip archive
datasets. Discussion of deployment viability in various
antimalware contexts is provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Email attachments are a straightforward delivery vec-
tor for malware campaigns, because, given a large
enough organization, a sufficiently complacent user is
bound to arise . Particularly in contexts when the con-
tents of messages are impersonal and large files are
exchanged on a routine basis (e.g., corporate environ-
ments), it is easy to provide attachments which look
legitimate, yet contain malicious content [1]. Generally,
attacks of this type require the user to download and/or
open the attached file, and, from the adversary’s perspec-
tive, it is often undesirable for the user to immediately
recognize the file as malicious even after the payload
gets executed – ransomware, for example, takes time to
index and encrypt targeted files [2]. Thus, effective threat
vectors, from an attacker’s perspective are those that are
commonly used by the targeted organization(s) yet have
sufficient flexibility to both preserve legitimate looking
content/structure and embed an attack.
In this paper, we examine two such types of attach-
ments: Microsoft Office documents and Zip archives.
Malicious Microsoft Office documents can be difficult
to detect because they leverage ubiquitous functionalities
that serve other purposes as well, for example, Microsoft
Office documents allow embedding of multimedia, Vi-
sual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros, JavaScript,
and even executable binaries to enhance functionality,
usability, and aesthetics. These capabilities have led to
high-quality office software that is easy-to-use, easy to
augment, and aesthetically pleasing, by design, but that
is also a vector for embedding malicious code. While this
threat vector could easily be mitigated, e.g., by removing
support for embedded VBA macros, such an approach
is infeasible in practice since consumers of commercial
software tend to favor functionality and aesthetics over
security. Thus, When securing against Microsoft Office
document vulnerabilities, we as security researchers and
practitioners must walk the thin line between reducing
consumer functionality on the one hand and mitigating
the spread and execution of malware on the other.
Archives (e.g., Zip, RAR) are even less constrained
in the format of their internal contents than office docu-
ments, and can easily be packed internally with any file
type. The inherent compression of most archive contents
has led to their popularity for exchanging documents
over email. However, an otherwise benign archive can
easily be made malicious simply by insertion of one or
more malicious files [3]. In both malicious and benign
settings, archives have been used to store code frag-
ments that are later executed by software external to the
archive, or conversely, archives have been embedded into
other programs to form self-extracting archives [4]. In
a canonical malicious use-case, archives are distributed
via phishing techniques [5] such as impersonating an
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important contact, perhaps via spoofed email header,
with the hope that the victim will unpack and run
the archive’s contents, e.g., a malicious JavaScript file
executed outside of a browser sandbox. Such techniques
have become increasingly common for malware propa-
gation, particularly as of late.
Due to the unconstrained types of content that can
be embedded into office documents and archive email
attachments, they seem like natural candidates for ma-
chine learning. Unlike signature-based engines, machine
learning offers the advantage that it can learn to gen-
eralize malicious behavior, and potentially generalize to
new malware types. In this paper, we assess the viability
of developing a machine-learnt static email attachment
scanner for these file types, by leveraging techniques that
have worked well for engines that detect other types of
malware. Our work makes the following contributions:
• We present evidence to support the viability of
a static machine learning based email attachment
detection.
• We have collected datasets malicious/benign Mi-
crosoft Office documents and archives containing
several million examples each.
• We present evaluations on novel real-world attacks
using Microsoft Office Documents infected with
Petya, suggesting that ML methods may work when
signature methods fail.
• We present a more realistic evaluation method for
conducting evaluations with noisy test data.
• We present an evaluation of classifiers and feature
types for office document and archive malware.
II. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND RELATED WORK
We were able to find little published work on mali-
cious office document detection: Nissim et al. [6] employ
an approach which uses zip file paths across a small
dataset of docx files. However, their approach Open-
XML specific and the dataset that they use is so small
that it is difficult to draw conclusions about how their ap-
proach might perform in a realistic deployment scenario.
Lagadec enumerates security issues with office document
formats and how to manually detect them in [7], but
his approach does not utilize machine learning. While
Lagadec [7] briefly discusses zip malware, we were only
able to find peripheral discussions of archive malware.
Malicious PDF detection [8], [9] is a similar vein of
research, but existing approaches focus on parsing the
PDF format which is fragile and does not generalize
well to other formats, and those that rely on dynamic
analysis are expensive and do not scale nicely. We seek
a generic approach that scales well.
While there are many academic papers that discuss
the machine learning antimalware approaches, most use
outdated and unrealistic datasets and do not map directly
to real-world problems [10]. The classifier and feature
types that we use in this paper were chosen based
on techniques that have worked well for real-world
antimalware problems involving detection of malicious
PE files. Saxe and Berlin employ a deep neural network
similar to ours [11], while Anderson and Roth employ
gradient boosted decision trees [12]. However, document
and archive file formats have their own unique challenges
because they are specifically designed to store user
provided content which may or may not be executed,
while PE files contain specified streams of execution.
As classifiers, we use feed-forward deep neural net-
works and gradient boosted decision ensembles. While
one could try more sophisticated types of neural net-
works – e.g., convolutional and recurrent, these are diffi-
cult to implement in practice due to large file sizes, com-
putational overhead, and a dearth of generic byte-level
embeddings. Though character-level embeddings have
yielded success for certain antimalware problems, e.g.,
[13], these do not yet work well for generic byte-level
embeddings of arbitrary length to our knowledge. Thus,
we instead transform each document/archive to a fixed-
length feature vector before using it to train a classifier.
Finally, we note that our focus in this paper is on on static
detection, because machine learning models require a lot
of data in order to work well. While antimalware stacks
consist of both static and dynamic components, dynamic
detection is very expensive computationally and is often
employed to post-process detections from static engines,
which operates much faster at scale. Dynamic detection
is an important, complementary, and orthogonal area of
research to that presented in this paper.
III. FILE STRUCTURES
Modern office documents generally fall into one of
two types: the OLE2 standard [14] and the newer XML
standard [15]. Microsoft Office’s Word, Excel, and Pow-
erpoint programs, along with analogous open source
programs typically save OLE2 standard documents with
.doc, .xls, and .ppt extensions and XML standard doc-
uments with .docx, .xlsx, and .pptx extensions. The
OLE2 standard was set forth by Microsoft and is also
known as the Compound File Binary Format or Common
Document File Format. OLE2 documents can be viewed
as their own file-systems, analogous to FAT, wherein
embedded streams are accessed via an index table. These
streams can be viewed as sub-files and contain text, VBA
macros, JavaScript, formatting objects, images, and even
executable binary code.
Open XML formatted office documents contain sim-
ilar objects, but are compressed as archives via Zip
standard compression. Within each archive, the path to
the embedded content is specified via XML. The user
interface unpacks and renders relevant content within
the Zip archive. Although the file format is different
from OLE2, the types of embedded content contained
are similar between the two formats.
Open XML office documents are thus special cases
of Zip archives, with a grounded well-defined structure,
and in fact many file/archive types are special cases of
the Zip format, including Java Archives (JARs), Android
packages (APKs), and browser extensions.
The structure of a Zip archive is shown in Fig. 1. The
central directory structure, located near the end of the file
contains names, references, and metadata about relevant
files residing in the archive. The references in the central
directory structure point to file headers, which contain
additional metadata, followed by compressed versions
of the files.
IV. FEATURE TYPES
In order to train the classifiers specified in Sec. V,
fixed-size floating point vector representations of fields
from input files/archives are required. From a practical
perspective, these feature space representations must be
reasonably efficient to extract, particularly for archives,
which can be hundreds of gigabytes in length. While we
use concatenations of features extracted from different
fields of files in our experiments, in this section, we
describe the methods that we use to extract features from
an arbitrary sequence of bytes. Several are adapted from
[11]. While the features that we use have been applied to
other antimalware applications, we are the first to explore
their utility for malicious email attachment detection.
N -gram Histograms are derived from taking N -gram
frequencies [16] over raw bytes. In practice, we use
3,4,5, and 6-grams, and apply the hashing trick [17] to
fix the dimensionality of the input feature space.
String Length-Hash Features are obtained by ap-
plying delimiters to a sequence of bytes and taking
frequency histograms of strings. Along a similar vein
to Saxe and Berlin [11], [13], we apply the hashing
trick over multiple logarithmic scales on string length
and concatenate the resultant histograms into a fixed-size
vector.
Fig. 1. Left: Structure of a Zip archive. The central directory structure
resides just before the end of directory structure at the end of the
archive. It contains an index of filenames and relative addresses
within the archive. File headers contain additional metadata and
are stacked above files which are compressed. Right: An entropy
heat map of a zip archive plotted over a Hilbert Curve, generated
using the BinVis http://binvis.io/#/ tool. The high-entropy regions
(magenta) correspond to file contents, while the lower-entropy regions
(blue/black) correspond to metadata. One can see that this archive
contains three files, and one can easily discern the central directory
structure at the end. Best viewed in color.
Byte Entropy Features are obtained by taking a
fixed-size sliding window, with a given stride, over a
sequence of bytes and computing the entropy of each
window. For each byte value, for a given window, the
byte entropy calculation in that window (or zero) is
stored, and a 2D histogram is taken over (byte value,
entropy) pairs. The rasterized histogram becomes the
fixed-size feature vector. In this paper, we employ a
window size of 1024 with a stride of 256.
Byte Mean-Standard Deviation Features are ob-
tained using a similar fixed-size sliding window of given
stride, but this time, the 2D histogram is taken over
pairs of (byte mean, byte standard deviation) within each
window. The rasterized histogram becomes the fixed-size
feature vector. Similar to byte entropy features, we we
employ a window size of 1024 with a stride of 256.
V. CLASSIFIER TYPES
We conducted our evaluations using two classifier
types that have achieved popularity for other antimal-
ware tasks: deep neural networks (DNNs) and gradient
boosted decision tree ensembles. While these classifiers
are highly expressive and have advanced the state of the
art in several problem domains, their formulations are
quite different from one another.
Neural networks consist of functional compositions
of layers, which map input vectors to output labels.
The deeper the network, i.e., the more layers, the more
expressive the composition, but also the greater the
likelihood of over-fitting. Neural networks with more
than one hidden (non input or output) layer are said
to be “deep neural networks”. In our case, the input
vector is a numerical representation of bytes from a file,
and the output is a scalar malicious or benign label.
The (vector,label) pairs are provided during training for
the model to learn the parameters of the composition.
Further details on DNNs can be found in [18]. We
implemented our DNN in Keras [19], employing a
similar topology to that of Saxe and Berlin [11], using 4
hidden layers of size 1024 each with rectified linear unit
(ReLU) activations. At each layer we employ dropout
and and batch normalization regularization methods,
with a dropout ratio of 0.2. At the final output we use a
sigmoid cross-entropy loss function:
J(xi; yi, θ) = yilogσ(f(xi); θ)+ (1− yi)log(1−σ(f(xi); θ), (1)
where θ correspond to all parameters over the network,
xi corresponds to the ith training example, yi corre-
sponds to the label for that example, f(xi) corresponds
to the pre-activation output of the final layer, and σ(·)
is the logistic sigmoid function. We optimized θ using
the Keras framework’s default ADAM [20] solver, with
minibatch size of 10k, and performed early stopping
when loss over a validation set failed to decrease for
10 consecutive epochs.
Decision trees, instead of trying to learn a latent rep-
resentation whereby data separates linearly, partition the
input feature space directly in a piecewise-linear manner.
While they can fit extremely nonlinear datasets, the re-
sultant decision boundaries also tend to exhibit extremely
high variance. By aggregating an ensemble of trees,
this variance can be decreased. Gradient boosting [21]
iteratively adds trees to the ensemble; given loss function
J(F (x; θ), y), and classification function F (x; θ) for the
ensemble, a subsequent tree is added to the ensemble
at each iteration to fit pseudo-residuals of the training
set, −∂J(F (xi;θ),yi)∂F (xi;θ) . The subsequent tree’s decisions are
then weighted so as to minimize the loss of the overall
ensemble. For our gradient boosted ensembles, we used a
regularized logistic sigmoid cross-entropy loss function,
similar to that of our neural network (cf. Eq. 1), but
unlike with the network, wherein all parameters are
jointly optimized with respect to the cost function, the
ensemble is iteratively refined with the addition of each
decision tree – i.e., additional parameters are added
to the model. Our implementation uses the eXtreme
Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) implementation by Chen et
al. [22]. For our choice of hyperparameters, we employed
a maximum depth per tree of 6, a subsample ratio of
0.5 (on training data; not columns), and hyperparameter
η of 0.1. We used ten rounds without improvement in
classification accuracy over a validation set as a stopping
criterion for growing the ensemble.
VI. OFFICE DOCUMENTS: EXPERIMENTS AND
DISCUSSION
We collected an initial dataset of 5,023,243 malicious
and benign office documents by scraping files and reports
from the VirusTotal [23] service, a service which submits
files to a variety of antimalware products and returns
vendor responses. We assign malicious/benign labels on
a 5+/1- basis, i.e., documents for which one or fewer
vendors labeled malicious, we ascribe the aggregate
label benign, while documents for which 5 or more
vendors labeled malicious, we ascribe the aggregate label
malicious. We initially collected 6 million documents,
but leave those with between 2 and 4 (inclusive) vendor
responses out of our dataset. We use this 5+/1- criterion
in part because vendor label information is given after
some time lag between the first seen time of a sample
and the last scan time of the sample, and when we
Fig. 2. Numeric breakdown of VirusTotal dataset documents by file
type. The majority of available data consists of legacy (.doc) and new
(.docx) word processing formats. Best viewed in color.
deploy we want our classifier to be able to make a
good prediction that is somewhat unaffected by biases
within the vendor community. Empirical analysis internal
to Sophos suggests that this labeling scheme works
reasonably well for assigning aggregate malicious/benign
scores. Note also that due to the fundamental generalized
nature of machine learning, the goal here is not merely
to emulate vendor aggregation but to learn predictive
latent patterns that correctly make future predictions of
malicious/benign when other vendors’ signature-based
methods fail. The breakdown of VirusTotal derived doc-
ument dataset by format type is shown in Fig. 2.
Since our objective is to obtain a predictive classifier,
we performed a 70/30 quantile split on the first seen
timestamp from VirusTotal, allocating the first 70th per-
centile as a training set and the last 30th percentile as
our test set. Note that for realistic evaluation, training
samples must come temporally before test samples. As
malware is constantly evolving, simply performing a k-
fold cross validation across all data is unrealistic because
it implicitly assumes that we have information about
future malware samples, and would thus lead to a grossly
inflated estimate of the efficacy of the classifier. To
obtain an estimate of the deployment performance of the
classifier, where it will be trained on available data and
then used to detect (potentially novel) malware from that
point forward, we must ensure that the evaluation set is
composed of files obtained after the newest file in the
training set.
We conducted a multitude of experiments using both
DNN and XGBoost classifiers with byte entropy his-
tograms, string length-hash histograms, and byte mean-
standard deviation histograms as features. We extracted
features across whole documents, and found that length-
hash features disproportionately performed the best of
any one feature type when delimiting by non-printable
characters as well as “<”, “>”, “/”, “\”, and “ ”. Byte
entropy and mean-standard deviation histograms were
uniformly spaced along each axis, initially to have a
total of 1024 bins, then later downsized to 256 bins
each after experiments indicated negligible gain from
added feature dimension. String length-hash features
were configured to have a total of 1024 dimensions;
64 per logarithmic scale of string length. Only strings
between 5 and 128 characters were considered, with the
remainder ignored. We also logarithmically scaled the
bins as we found that this resulted in a slight performance
increase. We also tried unpacking and concatenating the
contents of compressed Open XML format documents
prior to extracting features. Surprisingly, this resulted
Fig. 3. ROC curves for office document DNN and XGB classifiers
with FPR/thresholds assessed over the VirusTotal dataset (VT) and
Common Crawl dataset (CC). We believe that the VirusTotal dataset
is rife with false positives that all vendors miss since files submitted
are disproportionately malicious/suspicious, and that obtaining TPRs
on the VT dataset at FPRs/thresholds derived from the CC dataset
yields a more realistic evaluation.
in a performance decrease, which suggests that our
classifiers predominantly learn from file metadata.
Using concatenations of all feature vectors – string
length-hash, byte entropy, and byte mean-standard devia-
tion histograms, for both DNN and XGBoost Classifiers,
we were able to obtain an area under a receiver operating
characteristics (ROC) curve of greater than 0.99, with
the DNN slightly outperforming XGBoost (cf. red lines
in Fig. 3). Using the same features to train a linear
support vector machine under a tuned C value yielded
less than 0.90 AUC, suggesting that expressive nonlinear
concepts can indeed be derived from our input feature
space representations, pointing to the utility of more
expressive nonlinear classifiers.
Interestingly, we found that the DNN’s performance
did not noticeably improve when using a concatena-
tion of all features, as opposed to just string length-
hash features, but XGBoost’s performance improved
substantially. This suggests that our DNN architecture
is favorable, from a deployment perspective, as feature
extraction accounts for the majority of processing time
at inference – particularly when classifying large docu-
ments.
As an exploratory analysis, we also tried using the
outputs from intermediate layers of the trained net-
work on our train and test sets as feature vectors
for XGBoost, since the learning processes of the two
Fig. 4. Numeric breakdown of Common Crawl dataset documents by
file type. As with the VirusTotal datset, the majority of available data
consists of legacy (.doc) and new (.docx) word processing formats,
suggesting coarse alignment in terms of dataset balance/bias. This is
an important consideration when using the dataset to assess realistic
thresholds for false positive rate. Best viewed in color.
classifiers are fundamentally different, but this resulted
in a performance degradation. We also tried training
models with additional hidden layers, which yielded
slightly decreased performance, as well as separate ma-
licious/benign outputs – one per file-type – along with
a global malicious/benign score under a MOON-like
topology [24]. While the MOON-like network yielded
slightly better performance in low FPR regions of the
ROC, performance deteriorated in higher FPR regions,
yielding no net gains for the added complexity.
During our evaluation, we conducted our own foren-
sic investigation of the dataset, dumping VBA macros
for 100 “benign” files from VirusTotal that our DNN
labeled malicious with high confidence. In the majority
of cases, we found signs of malicious payloads and code
obfuscation, suggesting that a good number of “false
positives” from our VirusTotal dataset might actually be
false negative novel attacks that all vendors missed.
This finding from our forensic analysis leads us to con-
sider that using vendor labels from VirusTotal as a test
criterion may be implicitly biasing our success criteria
to currently existing classifiers and unfairly penalizing
those capable of generalizing to novel malicious behavior
seen in novel attacks. After all, most of the vendor scores
in VT come from signature-based – not machine learnt
– anti-malware engines. Thus, we surmise that using VT
gives us an unfairly pessimistic estimate of false positive
rate. This is exacerbated because files submitted to VT
are far more likely to be malicious (or at least suspicious)
than most files in the wild.
We therefore collected an additional corpus of approx-
imately 1 million likely benign documents scraped from
known benign URLs from Common Crawl [25] – a web
archiving service – and submitted these to VirusTotal
for labeling. Of the Common Crawl documents, only
a 15 were labeled as malicious. Discarding these and
taking the rest as benign, we used this Common Crawl-
derived dataset to re-evaluate false positive rate, and us-
ing corresponding thresholds, estimated the true positive
rate on VirusTotal. Via this procedure, we were able to
achieve noticeable gains (cf. the blue lines in Fig.3).
Note that this may even be an under-estimate of true
performance because gains in the network from detecting
mislabeled false negatives in our VirusTotal dataset are
not recognized (but at least now they are not penalized).
As an additional qualitative analysis of our network’s
capability to generalize malicious concepts, we con-
ducted an analysis on office documents infected by
the recent Petya ransomware, a malware notorious for
employing novel exploits [26]. While we will not com-
ment on specific vendors’ detection capabilities, Petya
was able to propagate undetected and cause a global
cyber security crisis despite the presence of numerous
antimalware engines. At a threshold yielding an FPR of
1e-3 assessed on our Common Crawl dataset, we were
able to detect 5 out of 9 malicious Petya samples, which
provides further (albeit anecdotal) evidence that our
DNN may have learned generalized malicious concepts
within its latent representations beyond any capacity of
signature-driven systems. Note also that all data upon
which the network was trained was collected prior to
the Petya outbreak.
VII. ZIP ARCHIVES: EXPERIMENTS AND
DISCUSSION
Along a similar vein to our office document dataset,
we collected a dataset of approximately 500k Zip
archives by scraping VirusTotal. We found that Zip
archives exhibited much larger variation in size than of-
fice documents. We performed a similar 70/30 train/test
split on timestamps as we did for office documents,
grouping samples with VirusTotal first seen timestamps
in the first 70th percentile into our training set and
samples with first seen timestamps in the last 30th
percentile into our test set.
While for such a small dataset we could simply extract
and concatenate content and metadata, from a practical
perspective, this becomes problematic when dealing with
large, potentially nested zip archives. Moreover, findings
from Sec. VI suggest that useful features for classifica-
tion are typically contained within metadata for a very
structured subset of Zip archives (Open XML format
office documents). Extracting similar string length-hash
features over entire archives and fitting a DNN, yielded
an ROC with an AUC of less than 0.9, which is not
useful for commercial antimalware applications.
We hypothesized that this poor performance was due
to a low signal-to-noise ratio in the feature space, and
thus chose to extract a set of features over more relevant
sections of Zip archives. Using our knowledge of Zip
archive structure (cf. Fig. 1), we arrived at an easy-
to-extract set of features: First, by matching appropri-
ate magic numbers, we dumped raw bytes from each
archive’s central directory structure. We then dumped the
last 1 MB of the archive’s raw bytes, or the entire archive
for archives less than 1 MB in size. Over the central
directory structures, we extracted 1024 dimensional fea-
ture vectors: string length-hash histograms, byte entropy
features, and hashed 3,4,5, and 6 grams. Over the last
1 MB we extracted 1024 MB byte entropy features and
string length-hash histograms. We omitted n-grams due
to lengthy extraction times. For our string length-hash
features, we used a similar parameterization to Sec. VI,
except that we used length 2 as a lower-bound cutoff for
considering a given string.
As classifiers, we used the same XGBoost and DNN
classifiers described in Secs. VII and VI Results are
shown in Fig. 5. Surprisingly, the DNN’s performance
was inferior to XGB over any single feature type, and
using a concatenated 5120-dimensional feature vector
the network noticeably under-performed XGB, offering
an ROC with an AUC of 0.98. Concatenating all features
using XGBoost yielded an AUC of greater than 0.99,
with differences particularly pronounced in low-FPR
regions.
Via the same methodology in Sec. VI, we used the
network to extract deep features, concatenated them with
the five feature types, and fit an XGBoost classifier.
This resulted in noticeably diminished performance for
the XGBoost classifier, suggesting that the network was
unable to learn a meaningful feature space. Perhaps this
problem could be ameliorated by using a larger archive
dataset, or perhaps archives are intrinsically harder to
learn meaningful features on than documents.
Fig. 5. ROC curves for the best DNN (red) and XGBoost (black)
classifiers using the Zip archive dataset. The dashed blue line (middle)
was obtained by concatenating deep features obtained from the
network to the original feature vectors and performing training/testing
over these using XGBoost classifier over these. The performance
decay suggests that the DNN has not learned a good feature space
representation for the problem at hand.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The exploratory research conducted herein suggests
that machine learning is a viable approach for certain
malicious email attachment scanner applications, partic-
ularly those tuned for a high false positive rate, where
false positives are passed to a secondary scanner for
enhanced detection – e.g., a dynamic detection engine
in a sandbox. Using fixed-size histogram features as
input, both DNN and XGB classifiers offered comparable
performance for office document data, but XGB far and
away outperformed DNNs on generic Zip archive data.
Perhaps, a larger amount of data is simply required for
DNNs to perform well. The fact that concatenating deep
features as input to our XGB classifiers did not improve
XGB suggests perhaps that our DNNs are simply learn-
ing to “memorize” interesting patterns without deriving
feature spaces that offer smooth statistical support. In the
future, we plan to collect a larger datasets and perhaps
explore additional attachment types (e.g., RAR, 7ZIP,
GZIP, CAB, PDF, etc.). Even if the network tends to
use its capacity for “memorization”, more data could
render a deep learning approach practical with respect to
accuracy. However, “memorization” may pose a problem
with respect to generalization capability and suggests
potential susceptibility to novel malware types or adver-
sarial attacks. While an analysis of adversarial attacks is
beyond the scope of this work, we note that our feature
representation may make it difficult to evade our model
with gradient-based attacks, such as those developed in
[27]–[31]. Such attacks produce modified feature vectors
that are ‘close’ to the original feature vector under
some distance measure that are misclassified. Because
our feature representations make heavy use of hashing,
identifying the modifications to a file that would produce
the desired modifications in the feature vector would
require, for at least some features, inverting the chosen
hash function.
There is a lot of room to expand the use of deep
learning both for malicious email attachment detection
and other anti-malware applications that we and others
in the community are researching, including learning
embeddings and sequence models over features from
different sections of a file, leveraging large quantities
of unlabeled data, e.g., via ladder networks [32], and
discovery of generic byte-level embeddings. It will be
interesting to see the viability of these approaches in the
coming years.
From a deployment perspective, how a combined
model might look across different attachment types is
an interesting question. Given a centralized mail server,
one option would be to have many classifiers for dif-
ferent attachment formats, but a better solution from an
endpoint perspective would be to have a single shared
representation handle multiple file types. The extent
to which a joint representation can be leveraged over
multiple file types and formats without introducing the
problem of catastrophic forgetting [33] is an important
area for future research.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was funded by Sophos PLC.
REFERENCES
[1] Edward Wilding. Information risk and security: preventing and
investigating workplace computer crime. Routledge, 2017.
[2] Amin Kharraz, William Robertson, Davide Balzarotti, Leyla
Bilge, and Engin Kirda. Cutting the gordian knot: A look under
the hood of ransomware attacks. In International Conference
on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability
Assessment, pages 3–24. Springer, 2015.
[3] Farid Daryabar, Ali Dehghantanha, and Hoorang Ghasem
Broujerdi. Investigation of malware defence and detection
techniques. International Journal of Digital Information and
Wireless Communications (IJDIWC), 1(3):645–650, 2011.
[4] Bryan Ford. Vxa: A virtual architecture for durable compressed
archives. In FAST, volume 5, pages 295–308, 2005.
[5] Phishing with a malicious .zip attachment, April 2014.
[6] Nir Nissim, Aviad Cohen, and Yuval Elovici. Aldocx: detection
of unknown malicious microsoft office documents using desig-
nated active learning methods based on new structural feature
extraction methodology. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, 12(3):631–646, 2017.
[7] Philippe Lagadec. Opendocument and open xml security
(openoffice. org and ms office 2007). Journal in Computer
Virology, 4(2):115–125, 2008.
[8] Zacharias Tzermias, Giorgos Sykiotakis, Michalis Polychron-
akis, and Evangelos P Markatos. Combining static and dynamic
analysis for the detection of malicious documents. In Pro-
ceedings of the Fourth European Workshop on System Security,
page 4. ACM, 2011.
[9] Pavel Laskov and Nedim Sˇrndic´. Static detection of malicious
javascript-bearing pdf documents. In Proceedings of the 27th
annual computer security applications conference, pages 373–
382. ACM, 2011.
[10] Steve Cruz, Cora Coleman, Ethan M Rudd, and Terrance E
Boult. Open set intrusion recognition for fine-grained attack
categorization. In Technologies for Homeland Security (HST),
2017 IEEE International Symposium on, pages 1–6. IEEE,
2017.
[11] Joshua Saxe and Konstantin Berlin. Deep neural network
based malware detection using two dimensional binary program
features. In Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE),
2015 10th International Conference on, pages 11–20. IEEE,
2015.
[12] Hyrum S Anderson and Phil Roth. Ember: An open dataset
for training static pe malware machine learning models. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1804.04637, 2018.
[13] Joshua Saxe and Konstantin Berlin. expose: A character-level
convolutional neural network with embeddings for detecting
malicious urls, file paths and registry keys. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.08568, 2017.
[14] [MS-OLEDS]: OLE1.0 and OLE2.0 Formats.
[15] Introducing the Office (2007) Open XML File Formats.
[16] Ethan Rudd, Andras Rozsa, Manuel Gunther, and Terrance
Boult. A survey of stealth malware: Attacks, mitigation mea-
sures, and steps toward autonomous open world solutions. IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 2017.
[17] Wenlin Chen, James Wilson, Stephen Tyree, Kilian Weinberger,
and Yixin Chen. Compressing neural networks with the hashing
trick. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages
2285–2294, 2015.
[18] Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, and Aaron Courville. Deep
learning. MIT press, 2016.
[19] Franc¸ois Chollet et al. Keras, 2015.
[20] Diederik Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method for
stochastic optimization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[21] Jerry Ye, Jyh-Herng Chow, Jiang Chen, and Zhaohui Zheng.
Stochastic gradient boosted distributed decision trees. In
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Information and
knowledge management, pages 2061–2064. ACM, 2009.
[22] Tianqi Chen and Carlos Guestrin. Xgboost: A scalable tree
boosting system. In Proceedings of the 22nd acm sigkdd
international conference on knowledge discovery and data
mining, pages 785–794. ACM, 2016.
[23] Virus Total. Virustotal-free online virus, malware and url
scanner. Online: https://www. virustotal. com/en, 2012.
[24] Ethan M Rudd, Manuel Gu¨nther, and Terrance E Boult. Moon:
A mixed objective optimization network for the recognition of
facial attributes. In European Conference on Computer Vision,
pages 19–35. Springer, 2016.
[25] Jason R Smith, Herve Saint-Amand, Magdalena Plamada,
Philipp Koehn, Chris Callison-Burch, and Adam Lopez. Dirt
cheap web-scale parallel text from the common crawl. In ACL
(1), pages 1374–1383, 2013.
[26] Dan Goodin. NotPetya developers may have obtained NSA
exploits weeks before their public leak [Updated], June 2017.
[27] Andras Rozsa, Ethan M Rudd, and Terrance E Boult. Adversar-
ial diversity and hard positive generation. In Proceedings of the
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
Workshops, pages 25–32, 2016.
[28] Andras Rozsa, Manuel Gu¨nther, Ethan M Rudd, and Terrance E
Boult. Are facial attributes adversarially robust? In Pattern
Recognition (ICPR), 2016 23rd International Conference on,
pages 3121–3127. IEEE, 2016.
[29] Andras Rozsa, Manuel Gu¨nther, Ethan M Rudd, and Terrance E
Boult. Facial attributes: Accuracy and adversarial robustness.
Pattern Recognition Letters, 2017.
[30] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt Fredrik-
son, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami. The limitations
of deep learning in adversarial settings. In Security and Privacy
(EuroS&P), 2016 IEEE European Symposium on, pages 372–
387. IEEE, 2016.
[31] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Adversarial examples are
not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence
and Security, pages 3–14. ACM, 2017.
[32] Antti Rasmus, Mathias Berglund, Mikko Honkala, Harri
Valpola, and Tapani Raiko. Semi-supervised learning with
ladder networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 3546–3554, 2015.
[33] Robert M French. Catastrophic forgetting in connectionist
networks. Trends in cognitive sciences, 3(4):128–135, 1999.
